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Words of advice for
the next president
n March 27, former Secretaries of 
State Henry Kissinger, James Baker III, 
Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright 
and Colin Powell gathered in Athens to 
discuss current U.S. foreign policy with the goal 
of providing advice and counsel to the next presidential 
administration. The session was moderated by Terence 
Smith, of “The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer,” before an 
audience of more than 2,000.
Sponsored by the Dean Rusk Center, in partnership with 
the Southern Center for International Studies, the two-
hour roundtable, titled “The Report of the Secretaries 
of State: Bipartisan Advice to the Next Administration,” 
has been edited for broadcast on PBS stations across the 
country. This program can also be viewed on the law 
school’s Web site at www.law.uga.edu. The following will 
provide you with excerpts from the forum. 
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AMERICA’S IMAGE ABROAD
POWELL: I think it will begin to change with a new president no 
matter which [one of the] three candidates win. You get a reset at 
that time. And if that new president begins by reaching out to all 
of our friends and allies around the world, and not only convey 
our points of view and what we believe in, but listen and hear what 
we are listening to, actually hear it and act on it and show that 
kind of comity to other nations of the world, we’ll begin to turn 
that around. … I think there are some things the new president 
can do right away that will begin to return to us a 
more favorable position. For example, … close 
Guantanamo immediately, and by closing 
Guantanamo saying to the world we are 
now going to go back to our tradi-
tional respective forms of dealing 
with people who have potentially 
committed crimes. 
ALBRIGHT: I personally have 
never seen the world in such a 
mess. … I think the next presi-
dent is going to have a very big 
job. I think a lot of it does have 
to do with our actions, and 
Colin, I think, has described 
those. But, also, [Terrence 
Smith] asked what does it matter 
to us, and I think it matters in the 
following way: Since the president 
and the secretary's of state job is to 
protect the national security of the United 
States, it hurts us if we are so disregarded or 
maligned because we’re not able to get the kind 
of support we need for whatever the issues are, whether 
they are going into Afghanistan or dealing with the financial crisis 
or dealing with climate change issues. … I don’t care whether we’re 
loved or not. I think, though, we need to be respected and not nec-
essarily just feared for doing the wrong thing. And I would hope that 
one of the first things that the next president would do, would not 
only close Guantanamo, and I totally agree on that, but also make 
very clear that we will rejoin or lead an effort on climate change.
BAKER: I agree with [Secretary Albright] completely that the next 
president should lead an effort among the nations to try and do 
something about climate change. A lot of the problems that face the 
country today are not discrete with respect to specific areas of the 
world. They are transnational problems dealing with terrorism and 
global climate change and trade and economic issues and that’s what 
the next president – [the] kind of thing the next president is going 
to have to deal with.
CHRISTOPHER: I’m one of those who thinks that in order to be 
strong abroad, we have to be strong at home and that’s just not mili-
tarily but economically as well. And, I see our domestic economy as 
a severe problem for us around the world. … The weak American 
dollar is kind of a metaphor for me for the weakness of America 
abroad, and that’s beginning to hurt very badly. And, I think one 
of the things the new president ought to do is to try to get our 
economic house in order. … On Guantanamo, Terry, I agree com-
pletely with Colin Powell. 
BAKER: With respect to Guantanamo, let me say I totally agree 
with what Colin and Madeleine and Chris (referring to 
Secretary Christopher) have said. I think it ought to 
be closed. And I think it – I think it gives us a 
very, very bad name, not just internation-
ally. And, maybe this is because I’m a 
lawyer, but I have a great deal of dif-
ficulty understanding how we can 
hold someone, pick somebody 
up, particularly someone who 
might be an American citizen, 
even if they’re caught some-
where abroad acting against 
American interests, and hold 
them without ever giving them 
an opportunity to appear before 
a magistrate and say yes or no or 
prove that they’re not an enemy 
combatant, if you would. 
KISSINGER: I agree with the 
impact that Guantanamo has inter-
nationally. … And, I would like to see 
it closed. But I would also like to see what 
the alternative is, what the consequences are 
when it is closed because some of the people that 
apparently are there would be very hard to put into an 
American judicial system. … I would like to know what one does 
in situations in which there’s a clear threat to the security of the 
United States. 
IRAQ WAR 
CHRISTOPHER: Two and a half months before the war I wrote an 
op-ed piece opposing the war. Let me just read a couple of sentences 
from that, if I might: “… Even if the optimistic predictions of a 
quick victory prove to be accurate, we would find ourselves then 
absorbed with the occupation of Iraq in efforts to impose democracy 
on the fractious elements of that country.” ... It seems to me that 
after five years we’ve had, from the White House, Iraq on the front 
burner, Iraq all the time. And, I think for the health of our country 
we need – we need to get past that now. Secretary Baker led a com-
mission that prescribed some very good remedies in that situation 
which unfortunately have not been taken, and I look forward to dis-
cussion around the table about how – how we do get out of this.
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BAKER: [The Iraq Study Group] Report recommended that 
we start talking to Iran in the same way we talked to Iran about 
Afghanistan. This administ – current administration, Colin was 
probably secretary of state, talked to Iran about our common inter-
est in a stable Afghanistan after we went in there, and Iran helped us 
and cooperated a little bit with us. Colin can amplify on that. We 
need to do the same thing with respect to Iraq. That’s what our Iraq 
Study Group Report suggested. Because a dysfunctional Iraq, cha-
otic Iraq, is not something that is in the interest of Iran. They don’t 
want that. They’ll have a ton of refugees, so there’s every incentive on 
their part to help us the same way they did in Afghanistan, if we’re 
willing to approach them without preconditions. 
KISSINGER: On negotiation with Iran, I agree with Jim that one 
has to talk to adversaries but one should not treat it as a psychiatric 
problem, so that it’s just a question of going into a room and creat-
ing goodwill. How well we negotiate with Iran depends in part on 
the objective balances that exist in the region. The reason it worked 
when Colin was secretary is because we had a force in Afghanistan. 
We were changing the situation, but we recognized that Afghanistan 
could not be solved without the participation of the neighbors, 
and in that context, it was possible to get an agreement. … If Iran 
considers itself a significant country that wants to be respected, 
we ought to find a mode of negotiation. … Because if things get 
tougher, we have to be able to tell the American people that we have 
done everything we can to explore a peaceful evolution. 
CHRISTOPHER: I have a few scars [from] trying to negotiate with 
Iran over a 14-month period, and one of the lessons I bring back 
from that is that there are many vectors of power in Iran, many dif-
ferent channels for opening dialogue. Too often we think of Iran in 
terms of President Ahmadinejad, and we fail to take into account 
the importance of the clerics, leaders like Khomeini and long-time 
leader like Rafsanjani. So I think we need to explore every one of 
those vectors of power to try to find an opening. … I think over 
time, we need to have a comprehensive dialogue with Iran because 
if we talk about only those things we want to talk about that might 
freeze the negotiations.
POWELL: I would like to align myself of the position that says 
we should reach out and begin talks with Iran. In the first term of 
the administration I was talking to the Syrians on a regular basis. I 
went to Damascus several times. They’re not always pleasant visits, 
but you’ve got to do it. … The Syrians and the Iranians live in that 
neighborhood. They’re an essential part of any solution, and we 
have to find ways of talking to them. … On Iraq itself, if I may, the 
United States Army and the United States Marine Corps, they can-
not keep up this level of deployment. It is a serious problem. And 
so my best judgment is that no matter what is being said right now, 
the drawdown will have to continue if for no other reason than it is 
not sustainable with the size military that we have. The other thing 
that I would like to say is that we have to have a clear understanding 
of what the problem is. … Al Qaeda is there in Iraq. It wasn’t there 
before, but it is now. But even if you got rid of Al Qaeda totally, you 
have the basic underlying problem which is not Al Qaeda. There is 
a conflict taking place between the Shias and the Sunnis, and within 
the Shias, for power and survival and for control of the country. 
And, there’s just so much we can do with the United States’ armed 
forces to resolve that conflict or even contain it, sooner or later. … 
The Baker-Hamilton report discussed this in considerable detail and 
advocated a policy of let’s start disengaging somewhat, not go away, 
not cut and run, and no president will find that to be an acceptable 
policy. … I don’t think it’s sustainable for 140 or 150,000 American 
soldiers to just sit there forever fighting Shias one day, fighting 
Sunnis the next day. It has to be passed off to the Iraqis. 
ALBRIGHT: Because as Secretary Powell was saying, it’s very hard 
for us to stay there. But we also have to figure out what our – how to 
use the United Nations on the sanctions, how to find what we have 
in common with the Iranians, because we do. And, I think that we 
need to focus ourselves on how the next president uses that array of 
tools in the toolbox and allows a mix and match. 
BAKER: I think one of the worst things we could do when we start 
thinking about Iraq is to somehow say, well, we need to get out of 
there come what may. … We’re going to have to drawdown. That is 
going to have to happen, but that’s far different than setting a date 
and a precipitous withdrawal.
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
KISSINGER: As a practical matter, one has to involve the Europeans 
and the moderate Arabs in order to get guarantees for the security 
aspects that have to be part of such an agreement. I think the borders 
and the Arab part of Jerusalem should be part of the settlement. It’s 
tacitly understood. There will still be big disagreements about it, but 
I think the outline of the agreement is pretty clear. Two unsettled 
issues are – is it possible for the return of refugees to be limited to 
the Palestinian side? And, secondly, what is the security arrangement 
that prevents a outbreak in the Palestinian state of events like Gaza? 
And, that cannot be done by the local people alone. That requires 
some kind of international presence. 
CHRISTOPHER: We must get back to engaging the United States 
at the highest level, not just parachute trips in but real engagement. 
… Now, with respect to Hamas, that’s a very tough question. … 
And until we get all the Palestinians involved, we probably will not 
have reliable peace. Now, I was very glad to see that the current 
administration is beginning to reach out to Hamas through the 
Egyptians, and that may be the right route to go because they’re very 
difficult to deal with. And, … peace with half the Palestinians is not 
going to be very stable.
KISSINGER: But on the other hand, it’s not an unreasonable 
proposition to say that a party during negotiation should accept the 
existence of the other party.
CHRISTOPHER: Of course, I agree with you completely. That’s 
why, that’s why it’s tough.
BAKER: Let me suggest a way around that conundrum. In 1991, 
as we began to look at the possibility of convening an international 
conference to deal with the Arab-Israeli problem, … we did not 
speak to the Palestine Liberation Organization. It was a terrorist 
organization. I never had one meeting as secretary of state with 
Yasser Arafat. … We were foreclosed from doing that. So what did 
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we do? We found some Palestinians from within the territories who 
were not officials of [the] PLO, but who supported the PLO, and 
who, in fact, took their marching orders from the PLO and Yasser 
Arafat. We did this with the concurrence and approval of the – of 
our Israeli friends. … It was a construct that gave deniability to all 
the parties. … And, we ended up getting all of Israel’s Arab neigh-
bors to come to the table for the first time ever to negotiate peace 
with her. And, I think something like that might work today.
ALBRIGHT: But we were not able to deal with the PLO until 
you, Jim, as a result of your excellent work, were able, in fact, to 
bring them in. And then, … we were able to bring some result 
to the Palestinians dealing with the Israelis. I think that we need 
to be much more supportive of Mahmoud Abbas. He and Salam 
Fayyad, the prime minister, are people that are trying to deal with 
the issue, and they need to be able to show that they can deliver. … 
Economically, they have to show that democracy can deliver it to 
them. And, part of the reason that Hamas did as well as it did in the 
elections in Gaza was that they were performing constituency ser-
vices and giving various things – job creation, the economic aspects 
of Annapolis. I was in the Middle East right after Annapolis, and 
everybody was very excited about it. The question is whether the 
pledges that have been made, whether there really has been a way 
to work through what that process was promising. … People would 
love to see that happen. And, I think that the question is how to 
give enough strength to Mahmoud Abbas to be able to go forward, 
use some of the ideas that Jim has just stated in terms of working 
through some groups that are deniable … or what Chris (referring 
to Secretary Christopher) was saying, with the Egyptians because 
there has to be some way to break this log jam. 
POWELL: We tried hard in the first months of the administration 
to get something started, and I met with Chairman Arafat a number 
of times. And to be blunt, he couldn’t deliver. … He would look 
you right in the eye and say, “I will do exactly what you have said, 
General. You’re a general. I’m a general. I will obey.” And, as soon as I 
left the room, I knew it was just more nonsense. And, so we conclud-
ed in June of 2002 that this was not sustainable, and the president 
made his famous speech in June of 2002, which said we need more 
and new responsible leadership, and they responded to that. And, 
that’s how Mahmoud Abbas has become now president, first prime 
minister, now president. But, you have to be engaged. You have to 
find a way to deal with Hamas. Hamas was elected as the result of 
an election, and we insisted upon it. … Dr. Kissinger’s reservations 
about talking to Hamas, as somebody dedicated to the destruction 
of Israel, requires response in the kind that Jim talked about. 
AFGHANISTAN
KISSINGER: I find Afghanistan intellectually tougher than Iraq. 
… When you say make Afghanistan democratic, … it’s a long proj-
ect for Afghanistan has been an independent country governed by 
various warlords balancing their domains and their jurisdictions and 
uniting primarily when some foreign invader came in and making 
life very hard for them. We were involved in Afghanistan originally 
in the war because Al Qaeda’s headquarters and training operation 
was in Afghanistan. So, we have a national interest in preventing 
this from arising again. … So should Iran, because Al Qaeda was 
threatening Iran. So should Pakistan, so should Russia, so should 
China. I must tell you, frankly, I don’t know exactly what to do in 
Afghanistan except that I do not believe it’s possible to democratize 
Afghanistan through a military operation. 
POWELL: In some ways, I think, as does Henry, that Afghanistan 
is going to be more difficult in the long run than Iraq. … Iraq is 
a country that used to have institutions. It has an educated middle 
class. It has an economic base that has to be restarted. … Afghanistan 
is still driven mostly by tribal warlords, as they are called, and it is 
not going to be a Jeffersonian democracy in the lifetime of anybody 
in this room. So what do we want? … We want stability and security 
and a good relationship with us. … We have to do something to 
bring this about – have to do something about the drug problem 
that is eating up the country and will eat up its nation’s democracy 
because of the corruption involved in it. You’ve got to do something 
about banging down the Taliban and Al Qaeda. And, you can’t talk 
about stabilizing Afghanistan without talking about what’s going on 
in Pakistan.
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PAKISTAN
ALBRIGHT: I think Pakistan contains everything that gives you 
an international migraine. It has nuclear weapons. It has poverty, 
extremism, corruption and a lack of sense of where its democracy is 
going. And, it is of concern also because it is a staging area obviously 
for dealing with Afghanistan. I think, though, what I find very – 
very supportive at the moment are the elections in Pakistan.
BAKER: Do you think that the new prime minister of Pakistan 
should begin a dialogue with the militants?
ALBRIGHT: One of the problems, frankly Jim, you know better 
than I do even, is the fact that the military and some of the Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif ’s people dealt with a lot of the militants. So 
there’s a lot of cross-cutting issues, but I think they’re going to have 
to start talking to them.
BAKER: I thought it was interesting to see that they are suggesting 
they’re going to do that, which is a new approach and one that on 
its face would appear not to appeal to us but it may have some util-
ity. … I agree with everything Madeleine said. I think we ought to 
continue to do what we can to encourage the Paks to fight Al Qaeda 
and the Taliban in every way they can because they will not, they 
will not, get their country back if it ends up being turned over to 
that kind of government.
POWELL: We have to have a light touch. … A light touch in the 
sense [that] I don’t think we can tell the Pakistanis what to do with 
Musharraf or they should or should not negotiate with the militants. 
The Pakistanis are going to decide that within their system, their 
new system. And, frankly, if we start trying to lecture them and tell-
ing them what to do, I think that could, well, backfire. … Let’s also 
remember the history of Pakistan, that every time they have gone 
back to a, quote, democratic civilian type government, it’s come 
apart within a few years, and we’re back to a military dictatorship. 
KISSINGER: No elected government has ever gone to the end of 
its term because there’s been so much corruption, … so we shouldn’t 
celebrate too soon. I agree that we should not try to manage the 
domestic affairs of Pakistan. … So, yes, these elections are democrat-
ic. We shouldn’t particularly intervene in how they evolve, but it’s 
going to be a very complicated situation because they have nuclear 
weapons. They have an immediate impact on Afghanistan. They 
have an impact on India [and] China, so we have to understand 
what we mean by stability there as well as democracy.
INDIA
POWELL: It turns out that we have a very good relationship with 
India right now as a result of the work of a number of people sit-
ting here at this panel. … And, in the last couple of years, India has 
watched what’s been happening in Pakistan and in Afghanistan and 
have not reacted the way they might have in the past years. So, I 
think we have a more mature, stable relationship.
KISSINGER: I think the relationship with India is one of the very 
positive things that is happening, and it’s based in part because they 
have the world’s largest democracy. … India is very concerned about 
the impact of radical Islam. … They have the second largest Islamic 
population in the world, 160 million. … And therefore, they know 
if the Islamic group becomes largely fundamentalists and radical, 
it will spill over. So, their objectives … are very similar to us – no 
major power controlled in that area, no radical Islamic domination. 
And so, we can cooperate with them both on ideologic grounds and 
on – on strategic grounds. 
RUSSIA/NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
CHRISTOPHER: I think we ought to begin to see if we can’t 
encourage some independence on behalf of the new president, 
Medvedev. There’s just a little flicker that he might be willing to 
move away from Putin. … But more important, whoever is running 
Russia, and probably Putin will be running Russia, I think it’s essen-
tial for us to try to restore our nuclear dialogue with them. That’s 
really fallen into the abyss. START [the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty] has really stopped, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
has really stalled – virtually dead in the Senate. … The questions as 
to, you know, their own obedience to civil rights concerns, those 
are very tough, but we ought to keep those on the table … if they 
are going to be part of the G8 and, if they are going to be part 
of the European Union or the WTO, then we ought to demand 
from them the same kind of qualities and qualifications that we’ve 
demanded of others for entry into those bodies. 
ALBRIGHT: I think we all have agreed that it is important to 
look at a zero-based world in terms of nuclear missiles. I think it’s 
very hard to get to, but I think it is very important to have it as an 
agenda. … I am very concerned that President Putin, doesn’t matter 
where he sits, will continue to have a great deal of power, and that 
the Russians are playing a very dangerous game in terms of their oil 
diplomacy – or whatever one calls it – blackmail. But, we have to 
be very careful about what we put on the agenda with the Russians. 
We need them on certain issues in terms of how to deal with Iran, 
for instance, or North Korea. And so, we shouldn’t load it down 
with issues that complicate our lives and are unnecessary such as 
radar stations.
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BAKER: In terms of Russia, the advice to the new president is – can 
be very simple: We need the best possible relationship we can have 
with Russia. Madeleine pointed out why we need Russia. We’re 
going to need, really need, Russia if we’re ever going to deal with 
Iran’s nuclear problem. … We confronted them throughout the 
entire period of the Cold War, and it wasn’t the end of Western civi-
lization as we know it. … We ought to understand, Russia is going 
to have her own foreign policy interest. She’s going to assert her 
views. And, where they conflict with our vital interests, we ought 
to confront them. When we can cooperate with them, we ought to 
cooperate with them.
KISSINGER: Let me make a point, … one has to understand, I 
believe, that Russia is a country that has had a nervous breakdown. 
Here is a country that has lost 300 years of its history. It’s not just 
the communist period. [It’s] everything for which they struggled 
and fought from the time of Peter the Great. They’re right back to 
where they started. So, that creates a tremendous problem for their 
leadership of how to give that country an identity. … Now with 
respect to Putin, there’s sort of an obsession in this country about 
Putin as a person. My view is that if he wanted to be dictator, he’s 
chosen a really tough way to do it. Because the easy thing for him 
to do would have been to amend the constitution, since he controls 
the Parliament anyway, and give himself another term. He’s now 
brought in somebody as president, and he’s prime minister. The 
position of prime minister constitutionally is below the president. 
… This is not a very strong country. Their population is declining. 
They have a horrible health problem. They have huge tasks domes-
tically, and we should keep open the possibility of a constructive 
relationship. Because between them and us, we have 95 percent of 
the nuclear weapons in the world. On missile defense, I think we 
should explore that proposal of linking the radar systems that they 
make. At any rate, I don’t know where it would go, but we should 
keep open the possibility of a constructive dialogue and not focus 
it on one man.
POWELL: Two quick points. One, the Russian Federation is never 
going to be the Soviet Union again. They’re doing too well by not 
being the Soviet Union. They’ve never seen this level of wealth cre-
ation in their entire history. And so, we shouldn’t have that kind of 
fear that we’re going back to the past. We’re not. … The other thing 
we have to remember is, we sort of criticized Putin or Medvedev, 
they are enormously popular. They have brought a sense of respect 
and stability back to the Russian people, and Putin didn’t have to 
suppress the media or fiddle with the election. 
CHINA
BAKER: I think we ought to cooperate with [the Chinese] when 
our interests are similar. We have similar interests with respect to 
North Korea’s effort to obtain nuclear weapons, … to the issue of 
global climate change, with respect to [the] proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, with respect to energy demands and security of 
energy supply. … And, we have differences with them in areas such 
as Taiwan and human rights, … and we are beginning to develop 
a little bit of a difference with them with respect to their military 
buildup. … There are a lot of people out there who would suggest 
that somehow the United States and China are inevitably on a colli-
sion course. … I don’t happen to believe that. I think we could make 
it happen, … and it would be a terrible, terrible mistake.
CHRISTOPHER: One thing I would say that I found useful to 
remember when I was dealing with China and that is we have vastly 
different political systems. Our system, for all of its fault[s], depends 
upon the consent of the governed. … In China, that kind of con-
sent is really a hollow concept. They depend upon domination and 
that makes them very highly sensitive to any indication of dissent. 
… The Internet is going to make it much, much harder for them to 
maintain the kind of control that they think they need.
KISSINGER: One fundamental thing to say about these three past 
decades is that it’s the most consistent bipartisan American foreign 
policy. … One point I want to make is when we discuss foreign 
policy, we, as Americans, have a tendency to think of our concerns 
and then to make it sort of a catalog of what we would consider 
important. But, we also have to look at the Chinese ideas of country, 
with a long uninterrupted history of self-government … and that 
now, with all the apparent achievements, faces huge problems. They 
have a coastline that is like Europe and an interior that’s in a very 
underdeveloped state. They have cities that have huge infrastructure 
problems at any one moment. … So this is not a country that now 
can undertake international adventures. … We should not look at 
China as a military adversary. 
POWELL: I cannot come up with a scenario, other than defending 
the Taiwan Straits and perhaps defending them out to some dis-
tances in the Pacific, I cannot come up with a scenario where China 
would find it in its interest to any way to be aggressive towards the 
United States. They don’t have that kind of history or tradition, and 
they’re doing so well by not being in a hostile situation with the 
United States of America. … China’s major problem, and I’ll tell 
you, is not its pollution and all the other things we’ve touched on, 
but they still have close to 900 million to a billion people who have 
not benefited in the slightest from this wealth creation. They know 
it, and those people are getting mad.
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